Andries Joe Masoanganye (first appellant) and Tlaleng Alina Mhlekwa (second appellant) were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the North West High Court (Mafikeng) for theft of funds from the Guardian Fund. The first appellant was the Master and the second appellant the Assistant Master of the High Court in Mmabatho at the relevant time. They were allegedly working together with an attorney, Mr Abdul Kader Ahmed, who diverted money through his firm's trust account. Ahmed was also convicted and sentenced. The trial court granted them leave to appeal against conviction and sentence but refused the appellants bail pending appeal. Ahmed was granted bail. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal against the refusal of bail and also applied for directions that the appeal on the merits be heard by the SCA rather than the full bench of the high court. The appellants raised issues about special entries concerning alleged irregularities including refusal to separate trials, refusal to recuse, and failure to obtain a correctional supervision report for sentencing.
The appeal of the first appellant was dismissed. The appeal of the second appellant was upheld and she was granted bail in the amount of R25,000 subject to strict conditions including furnishing addresses, delivering notice of appeal within 10 days, setting a hearing date within 20 days of receiving the trial record, delivering heads of argument at least 20 days before the hearing, and surrendering within 72 hours if ordered. Failure to comply would result in cancellation of bail and forfeiture of bail money. The applications for the appeal to be heard by the SCA were dismissed and the notices of appeal filed in the SCA were to be returned as irregularly filed.
Special entries under section 318 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 are limited to recording irregularities affecting the trial that do not appear from the record; they do not apply to attacks on rulings made during court proceedings, which can be addressed through ordinary appeal processes. When considering bail pending appeal after conviction under section 321, the trial court must exercise its discretion by considering not only the prospects of success on appeal but also the seriousness of the crime, the risk of flight (assessed primarily by personal circumstances rather than solely financial assets), real prospects of success on conviction, and real prospects that a non-custodial sentence might be imposed. Where a convicted appellant may serve their full sentence before the appeal is finalized, thereby making the appeal academic, this is a relevant factor in favor of granting bail pending appeal.
The court expressed criticism about legislative oversight in not addressing procedural issues with bail appeals that the SCA has complained about for more than two decades. The court noted that the trial judge's failure to give reasons for granting leave to appeal was contrary to established practice. The court also noted that the delay of over four months in releasing the conviction judgment was prima facie inexcusable. The court observed that proximity between judges (such as where the trial judge is the judge president and other judges may hear the appeal) is typically addressed in the South African system by 'importing' judges from other high courts to hear the particular case if there are concerns. The court suggested that if the appellants had concerns about bias by specific judges assigned to the appeal, recusal applications should be directed to those judges at the appropriate time.
This case clarifies the proper scope and purpose of special entries under section 318 of the Criminal Procedure Act in modern South African criminal procedure. It emphasizes that special entries are anachronisms that only serve to record irregularities affecting the trial that do not appear from the record, not attacks on rulings made during proceedings. The judgment provides important guidance on the exercise of discretion in granting bail pending appeal after conviction under section 321, emphasizing that while reasonable prospects of success on appeal are necessary, they are not sufficient, and courts must consider multiple factors including seriousness of the crime, flight risk (assessed by personal circumstances not just assets), real prospects of success, and prospects of non-custodial sentence. It also reinforces the principle that appellate courts must defer to trial courts' bail decisions unless there is a failure to bring unbiased judgment, lack of substantial reasons, capricious exercise, or wrong principle applied. The case highlights the practical consideration that where an appellant may serve their full sentence before appeal is finalized, this makes bail more appropriate to prevent the appeal becoming academic.
Explore 1 related case • Click to navigate