The appellant was employed by the respondent from 29 June 1981 until his dismissal on 8 December 2015, allegedly due to operational requirements. He instituted an unfair dismissal claim in the Labour Court on 1 April 2016. Before November 2016, rumors circulated that the respondent was considering liquidation. In December 2016, the respondent passed a special resolution for voluntary liquidation, but the appellant was not notified. A liquidator, Mr. Barnard, was allegedly appointed on about 21 February 2017. The appellant only learned of the liquidation when it was published in the Government Gazette on 10 July 2017. On 25 August 2017 (about six months after the liquidator's appointment), the appellant gave notice to the liquidator in terms of section 359(2)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 that he would continue with his unfair dismissal claim. The respondent later took the position that the appellant had failed to comply with section 359(2)(a) and that his claim was deemed abandoned. The respondent brought a Rule 11 application to have the claim declared abandoned and dismissed.
The appeal was upheld. The order of the Labour Court was set aside and substituted with an order dismissing the Rule 11 application with costs. No costs were ordered in respect of the appeal itself.
The ratio decidendi includes the following binding principles: (1) The Labour Court has jurisdiction to determine applications under section 359(2)(b) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 for a direction that a claim is not abandoned, where such applications are ancillary or incidental to a main claim over which the Labour Court has jurisdiction. Section 12 of the Companies Act does not preclude this incidental jurisdiction. (2) The deeming provision in section 359(2)(a) of the Companies Act creates a rebuttable presumption that a claim is abandoned. The determination of whether a claim is deemed abandoned under section 359(2)(a) and whether the court should direct that it is not abandoned under section 359(2)(b) are interlinked inquiries, not disparate ones. (3) A liquidator may waive compliance with section 359(2)(a) as the provision exists for the liquidator's benefit to prevent being overwhelmed with legal proceedings. Having waived compliance, a liquidator cannot later insist on it. (4) To successfully invoke section 359(2)(a), admissible evidence must establish the crucial foundational facts, including the date of registration of the special resolution for voluntary winding-up and the date of the liquidator's appointment. Inadmissible hearsay evidence is insufficient for this purpose.
The Court made several obiter observations: (1) It is inconvenient and potentially unjust to require litigants to approach different courts for matters that are interlinked and ancillary to a main claim. (2) The common law principle of causae continentia supports extending jurisdiction to avoid duplication of proceedings and conflicting decisions. (3) Courts are obliged under section 39(2) of the Constitution to develop the common law, including rules relating to jurisdiction, to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. (4) Effectiveness is a key consideration in the exercise of incidental jurisdiction - courts should give effective judgments on all interlinked issues before them. (5) The Court distinguished the case from Direct Channel KwaZulu-Natal (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Naidoo & others on the facts, noting that in Direct Channel there was no application under section 359(2)(b) to declare the claim not abandoned, and no jurisdictional issue arose. (6) The Court observed that the failure to notify the appellant of the liquidation and liquidator's appointment, and the delayed publication in the Government Gazette, were relevant considerations in the overall factual matrix.
This case clarifies important principles regarding the interaction between company law (specifically section 359 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973) and labour law proceedings. It establishes that: (1) The Labour Court has jurisdiction to determine matters ancillary and incidental to claims properly before it, even where such matters involve company law provisions, notwithstanding section 12 of the Companies Act. This affirms the Labour Court's inherent powers and incidental jurisdiction. (2) The deeming provision in section 359(2)(a) creates a rebuttable presumption, not an absolute bar to litigation. (3) A liquidator can waive compliance with section 359 as the provision exists for the liquidator's benefit, and having done so cannot later insist on compliance. (4) Proper admissible evidence must be adduced to establish the foundational facts required to invoke section 359(2)(a), including the date of registration of the special resolution and the liquidator's appointment. The case reinforces the principle that courts should promote access to justice and avoid requiring litigants to pursue interlinked matters piecemeal in different fora.