The appellant was charged in the regional court, Kirkwood, with murder read with section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, for allegedly stabbing and killing Jeremy Swartbooi (the deceased) with a knife on 14 April 2012. The appellant pleaded not guilty and made a statement in terms of section 115 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, admitting that he stabbed the deceased once with a knife but contending he acted in self-defence. He stated he believed his life was in danger after an earlier verbal altercation. The State called two witnesses, Johnny Visagie and Andile James Tyokela, neither of whom witnessed the actual stabbing. Visagie testified that the deceased and appellant had a verbal altercation over smoking a pipe at a tavern, with the deceased taunting the appellant, but Visagie went inside before any stabbing occurred. Tyokela only saw the deceased running with blood coming from his neck. The appellant did not testify in his defence. He was convicted and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown dismissed the appeal against conviction but reduced the sentence to 10 years. The matter came before the Supreme Court of Appeal with special leave.
The appeal succeeded. The appellant's conviction and sentence imposed pursuant thereto were set aside.
A statement made by an accused in terms of section 115 of the Criminal Procedure Act does not automatically constitute a formal admission under section 220. Where a formal admission under section 220 is phrased in passive voice and does not explicitly admit that the accused performed the act in question, it cannot be treated as an admission of that fact. The onus remains on the State to prove by admissible evidence all facts put in issue by a plea of not guilty where the accused has not consented to formal admissions under section 220. Courts must not conflate section 115 statements with section 220 formal admissions, as this goes to the heart of whether the State has discharged its burden of proof. Where the State fails to adduce admissible evidence proving that the accused committed the actus reus of the offence, a conviction cannot follow, regardless of what may have been stated in a section 115 plea explanation.
The minority judgment (obiter) expressed the view that the Magistrate acted correctly under section 115(2)(b) in recording the admissions, with only an erroneous description of them as "formal admissions" before noting them as such. The minority also observed that where there is prima facie evidence implicating an accused, an evidentiary burden is imposed requiring the accused to adduce evidence sufficient to give rise to reasonable doubt, failing which the accused runs the risk of conviction. The minority further noted that exculpatory parts of a section 115 plea explanation should not be ignored in determining whether the State has discharged its onus, but need not be given significant weight as they are not given under oath and have not been tested in cross-examination. The minority stated that a formal admission can only be made in respect of unfavourable facts and an accused's statement that he acted in self-defence puts the unlawfulness of conduct in issue and cannot be regarded as an admission of what the State must prove.
This case is significant for clarifying the critical distinction between statements made in section 115 plea explanations and formal admissions under section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Act. It emphasizes that courts must carefully distinguish between the two, as they have different evidentiary effects. A section 220 formal admission constitutes sufficient proof of the fact admitted and relieves the State of proving that fact, whereas a section 115 statement, even where the accused agrees to certain facts, does not automatically become a formal admission unless properly recorded as such under section 220. The case highlights the importance of precise language in formal admissions - the use of passive voice may not constitute an admission that the accused performed the act. The judgment reinforces that where an accused does not consent to formal admissions, the onus remains on the State to prove all elements of the offence by admissible evidence. The case also demonstrates the dangers of conceptual confusion between different procedural mechanisms in criminal trials and how such confusion can lead to wrongful convictions. The minority judgment provides an alternative view on the evidentiary burden on accused persons who raise defences but fail to testify, showing ongoing judicial debate on this issue.