Mr Hughes (the applicant) entered into an agreement of sale on 12 February 2020 to sell a property in Houtbay to Mr Peter Henry Green for R4,950,000. The agreement was subject to a suspensive condition that Mr Green obtain approval for a mortgage loan by 13 March 2020 (later automatically extended to 2 April 2020). Mr Green paid a deposit of R1 million to the third respondent (Pam Golding Properties) but did not obtain mortgage approval by the due date. On 10 March 2020, an email from the conveyancer's secretary stated that the purchaser would pay the full purchase price in cash. The national Covid-19 lockdown intervened, and Mr Green eventually obtained mortgage approval on 10 June 2020. The first and second respondents (Mr Green's daughter and her partner) took occupation of the property and effected renovations. The transaction collapsed in August 2020 when illegal building work was discovered. The respondents vacated the property on 7 September 2020. Mr Hughes claimed entitlement to retain the deposit, alleging that Mr Green had waived the suspensive condition. Mr Green ceded his rights to the deposit to the first and second respondents, who brought an application for repayment of the deposit.
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.
For valid waiver of contractual rights, particularly suspensive conditions in agreements of sale, the party alleging waiver must prove on a balance of probabilities (though the onus is not easily discharged): (1) if the principal allegedly waived the rights, that the principal was aware of those rights, intended to waive them and did so unequivocally; (2) if an agent allegedly waived the rights on behalf of the principal, that the agent was duly authorised to waive those rights, the principal was fully aware of them, and the agent knew all relevant facts, was aware of those rights and intended to waive them; (3) where the contract stipulates formalities for waiver (such as written notice signed by the parties), these formalities must be complied with for the waiver to be valid; (4) subsequent conduct inconsistent with waiver may negate any alleged waiver; (5) the authority of a conveyancer to effect transfer does not extend to waiving substantive contractual rights without a special mandate. Where a suspensive condition in an agreement of sale is not fulfilled by the due date and has not been validly waived, the agreement lapses and becomes null and void, entitling the purchaser to repayment of the deposit.
The court made observations about the impact of the Covid-19 lockdown on conveyancing matters and property transfers, noting that the deeds office and related services were closed, causing delays. The court also noted that Mr Joubert (the conveyancer) did not understand what the suspensive condition entailed and had no grasp of which right was to be waived, as he regarded the approval of Mr Green's bond as fulfillment of the suspensive condition rather than as a matter requiring waiver. The court observed that people are unlikely to give up contractual rights without good reason, creating a factual presumption against waiver. The judgment also comments on the timing of when Mr Hughes first raised the issue of waiver—only after the property had been vacated—suggesting this undermined the contention that waiver had occurred much earlier.
This case clarifies the strict requirements for waiver of contractual rights in South African law, particularly in the context of agreements of sale subject to suspensive conditions. It reinforces the principle that waiver must be unequivocal and based on full knowledge of the rights being relinquished. The judgment emphasizes that where an agreement contains specific formalities for waiver (such as written notice signed by the parties), these must be complied with. The case also confirms the scope of authority of conveyancers and that authority to effect transfer does not extend to waiving substantive rights unless specifically mandated. It illustrates the application of the factual presumption against waiver and the high standard of proof required to establish waiver. The judgment also demonstrates the proper approach to determining whether leave to appeal should be granted under section 17 of the Superior Courts Act, requiring a reasonable prospect of success on the merits.
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