The Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others

During apartheid, South Africa experienced deep conflict characterized by gross violations of human rights, including murder, torture, and maiming of activists by state agents. Following negotiations in the early 1990s, an interim Constitution was adopted with an epilogue providing for national unity and reconciliation through an amnesty process. Parliament enacted the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (the Truth and Reconciliation Act), establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with three committees: the Committee on Human Rights Violations, the Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation, and the Committee on Amnesty. Section 20(7) of the Act provided that persons granted amnesty would be免 from both criminal and civil liability, and that the state and other bodies would also be免 from vicarious liability for such acts. The applicants, including AZAPO and families of victims of apartheid-era violence (including Biko, Mxenge, and Ribeiro), challenged the constitutionality of section 20(7), arguing it violated their right under section 22 of the Constitution to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law.

The application challenging the constitutionality of section 20(7) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 was dismissed. Section 20(7) was declared constitutional and valid.

This landmark judgment established the constitutional foundation for South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its amnesty process, one of the most significant transitional justice mechanisms in modern history. The case affirmed that the pursuit of truth, reconciliation, and national unity could constitutionally take precedence over individual justice through prosecution and civil claims. It interpreted the epilogue to the Constitution as having full constitutional status and authorizing comprehensive amnesty (both criminal and civil) as part of the negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy. The judgment recognized that the Constitution itself embodied a compromise between competing values: justice for victims versus truth-telling and reconciliation. It established that "understanding over vengeance" and "ubuntu over victimisation" were constitutional values. The decision has been influential internationally in debates about transitional justice, amnesty, and accountability for human rights violations. It demonstrates judicial deference to difficult political and policy choices made during constitutional transitions, while affirming that such choices must still be rooted in constitutional text and values. The case also clarified that international law obligations do not automatically override domestic constitutional arrangements, particularly in the context of internal conflicts and negotiated transitions.