The appellant, Combined Distribution Solutions CC, was a close corporation that conducted business as a broker in the courier industry. Ms Oosthuizen was its sole member. The appellant attempted to secure the business of Elster Kent Metering, which manufactured water meters and required courier services. The respondent, The Courier & Freight Group (Pty) Ltd t/a XPS, was the appellant's preferred service provider. To secure the Elster Kent business, the appellant needed to install an 'in-house' computer system on Elster Kent's premises by 20 February 2004. The appellant alleged that at a meeting on 11 February 2004, the respondent agreed to supply the necessary software and litho printer for the in-house system. However, on 18 February 2004, the respondent advised it could not supply a new Zebra printer, citing the R20,000 cost. Simultaneously, the respondent's credit manager was pursuing payment of outstanding amounts from the appellant (at least R90,524 was owing). On 23 February 2004, the respondent conditionally lifted a suspension of the appellant's account, requiring payment of R100,000 within two days and additional payments thereafter. These conditions were not met, and the account was suspended again on 25 February 2004. The appellant sued for damages of R696,428, being the alleged profit it would have earned from the Elster Kent business from March 2004 to October 2005.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
The binding legal principle established is that in a claim for damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove not only that a breach occurred, but also that damages were actually sustained in consequence of that breach. The proper test is a factual enquiry into what would have occurred had the contract been fulfilled. Where, on the facts, the plaintiff would not have been able to benefit from performance of the contract due to other supervening circumstances (such as suspension of credit facilities for non-payment of debts), no recoverable damages flow from the breach. Causation between breach and loss must be established. Additionally, payment of a debt into an attorney's trust account subject to conditions does not constitute payment or tender of payment to the creditor.
The Court made several obiter observations. First, Nugent JA clarified that an appeal lies against the order made by a court rather than against the reasons for the order, and that a respondent in whose favor an order was made need not note a cross-appeal to support the order on alternative grounds. Second, the Court commented on the common problem of separation orders where parties differ on the meaning and scope of what has been separated, noting that in this case 'quantum' in its ordinary meaning refers to the monetary amount and the separation order must be understood as leaving only that issue for later determination. Third, the Court noted (without deciding) that it was 'by no means clear' that the appellant would have secured the Elster Kent business even if the printer had been supplied. Finally, the Court observed that while the respondent might have been justified in employing two counsel, the appeal was not of such complexity that those costs should be borne by the appellant.
This case is significant in South African contract law for its illustration of the principles governing causation in claims for damages for breach of contract. It demonstrates that establishing breach of contract is insufficient; a plaintiff must prove that damages were actually sustained as a consequence of the breach. The case emphasizes the factual enquiry required: what would have occurred had the contract been fulfilled. It illustrates that even where breach is established, if the plaintiff would not have been able to perform their side of the bargain or benefit from the contract due to other circumstances (in this case, account suspension for non-payment), no recoverable damages flow from the breach. The case also confirms that payment into an attorney's trust account subject to conditions does not constitute payment or tender of payment, and reinforces the principle that contractual provisions allowing termination of credit facilities at the discretion of one party will be enforced.