The appellant, a South African company with a registered office in Johannesburg, intended to sue the two respondents (John and Andrew Strang), Australian citizens resident and domiciled in Australia, in the Johannesburg High Court for delictual damages arising from alleged breaches of partnership obligations. The respondents were directors of Australian companies with Southern African interests. To establish or confirm the Court's jurisdiction, the appellant applied for an order for the respondents' arrest, as they had no attachable property in South Africa and refused to consent to jurisdiction. The respondents opposed the application on two main grounds: (1) no prima facie case on the merits was established, and (2) arrest of foreign nationals to found or confirm jurisdiction would violate various provisions of the Bill of Rights, making the enabling legislation (section 19(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959) unconstitutional. The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development was joined as a party. The respondents were not in South Africa at any time relevant to the application. The High Court dismissed the application for want of a prima facie case without deciding the constitutional issue.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel. The common law rule requiring arrest to found or confirm jurisdiction was abolished and replaced with a rule that jurisdiction can be established (where attachment is not possible) by service of summons on the defendant while physically present in South Africa, provided there is sufficient connection between the suit and the court's area of jurisdiction. The challenged phrases in section 19(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Act were not declared invalid but are to be read down as redundant.
The common law rule requiring arrest of foreign defendants to found or confirm jurisdiction is unconstitutional as it infringes the rights to freedom and security of person (section 12 of the Constitution), equality, human dignity, freedom of movement, and potentially the right to a fair trial, without just cause. Arrest by itself does not render a judgment effective and serves merely to coerce security or payment from a defendant whose liability has not been proven. The limitation imposed by jurisdictional arrest on fundamental constitutional rights cannot satisfy the requirements of section 36(1) of the Constitution. The common law must be developed under sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution to abolish the requirement of arrest. Where attachment is not possible, jurisdiction can be established if (1) the defendant is served with the summons while physically present in South Africa, and (2) there is sufficient connection between the suit and the area of jurisdiction of the court such that disposal of the case by that court is appropriate and convenient. The concepts of 'appropriateness' and 'convenience' are elastic and can be developed case by case, with the strongest connection being provided by the cause of action arising within the jurisdiction.
The Court made several significant observations: (1) The Mhlungu principle (that constitutional issues should be avoided if a case can be decided on other grounds) is not inflexible, and in this case it was appropriate to decide the constitutional issue given its broader application to many cases involving resident plaintiffs suing foreign defendants. (2) The effectiveness of judgments, while described as 'the basic principle of jurisdiction in our law,' has been significantly eroded over time, with attached property sometimes being of 'trifling' value. Effectiveness is largely for the plaintiff to assess. (3) The question whether a prima facie case was made out need not be definitively determined, as minor amendments could likely address any deficiencies. (4) Physical presence within a jurisdiction as a basis for jurisdiction is accepted in other contexts, such as reciprocal enforcement of foreign judgments and in English law. (5) The words 'being in' in section 19(1)(a) do not assist in establishing jurisdiction based on mere physical presence, as authority holds that nothing short of residence suffices under that provision. (6) Issues of sufficient connecting links and effectiveness are fact-dependent and should be canvassed in pleadings and can be dealt with as separated issues under Rule 33(4). (7) In commercial litigation where no constitutional right is being advanced or public interest served, normal cost consequences should follow.
This landmark case fundamentally reformed South African civil procedure and jurisdiction law by abolishing the centuries-old common law practice of arrest to found or confirm jurisdiction over foreign defendants. The decision represents a significant application of constitutional values to reshape traditional Roman-Dutch law principles. It demonstrates the courts' power and duty to develop the common law in accordance with the Bill of Rights under sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution. The judgment establishes new jurisdictional principles that balance the legitimate interests of resident plaintiffs in accessing local courts with the fundamental rights of foreign defendants, particularly where no attachable property exists. The decision also illustrates the approach to be taken when historical legal practices, even long-standing ones, cannot be reconciled with constitutional imperatives. It provides practical guidance on establishing jurisdiction through service during physical presence combined with sufficient connecting factors, allowing for case-by-case development of what constitutes 'appropriate and convenient' jurisdiction.
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