The Democratic Alliance (DA) brought a constitutional challenge against section 6(1)(a) of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995. The impugned provision caused South African citizens to automatically lose their citizenship if they voluntarily acquired citizenship in another country without prior permission from the Minister of Home Affairs. The DA illustrated the provision's effects through Mr Phillip Plaatjes, a chartered accountant born in Cape Town who was naturalised as a British citizen in 2007 after marrying a British citizen. Unbeknownst to him, he automatically lost his South African citizenship. He continued travelling on his South African passport between 2007 and 2014 without immigration officials questioning his citizenship status. Only in 2014, upon reading an online article, did he discover he had lost his South African citizenship. When he sought clarification at the South African embassy in London in 2015, his passport was cancelled. The DA argued this automatic loss occurred without citizens' knowledge, consent or any legitimate government purpose, affecting many South Africans abroad who acquired dual citizenship in good faith.
1. The order of constitutional invalidity of the Supreme Court of Appeal is confirmed. 2. Section 6(1)(a) of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 is declared inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid from its promulgation on 6 October 1995. 3. Those citizens who lost their citizenship by operation of section 6(1)(a) are deemed not to have lost their citizenship. 4. The respondents are ordered to pay the applicant's costs in the Constitutional Court, including the costs of two counsel where so employed.
This judgment is of profound constitutional significance for several reasons: (1) It vindicates the fundamental right to citizenship enshrined in section 20 of the Constitution, emphasizing that citizenship is the 'gateway' through which numerous other constitutional rights are accessed. (2) It rejects artificial semantic distinctions between 'loss' and 'deprivation' of citizenship, establishing that automatic ex lege termination of citizenship without knowledge or consent constitutes deprivation. (3) It reinforces the rationality principle in constitutional law, holding that legislation affecting fundamental rights must serve a legitimate government purpose with a rational connection between means and ends. (4) It condemns unfettered, unbounded discretionary power in the executive, particularly where fundamental rights are at stake, reaffirming the principle in Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs. (5) It recognizes South Africa's position within global trends toward acceptance of dual citizenship, considering international law and foreign jurisprudence. (6) It provides restitution to potentially thousands of South Africans who unknowingly lost citizenship through dual nationality, by retrospectively invalidating the provision from its inception in 1995. (7) It demonstrates the Constitutional Court's willingness to intervene even where government officials 'abide the decision', fulfilling its constitutional duty under section 167(5) to scrutinize declarations of invalidity. The judgment represents a significant development in citizenship jurisprudence in South Africa, particularly given the country's apartheid history of citizenship deprivation.