The respondent, Tebe Trading (Pty) Limited, was an exporter of perishable fresh fruit (litchis) to the Middle East. On 26 November 2001, the appellant, Mediterranean Shipping Company (Pty) Limited, acting as agent for the carrier (MSC Geneva and/or the vessel owner), approached Tebe to secure cargo for a special voyage of the vessel MSC Spain from Durban to Dubai via Reunion, with an estimated departure date of 6 December 2001 and voyage duration of 12-14 days. Tebe arranged shipment of two containers of litchis under two bills of lading, one to Jebel Ali (Dubai) and one to Damman (Saudi Arabia). The timing was critical as the litchis would arrive before Eid celebrations. Due to port congestion, departure was delayed to 10 December, then 13 December when loading was completed. The MSC Spain sailed on 13 December 2001 but was recalled to port that afternoon after another vessel (MSC Camille) experienced an engine fire. On 14 December, 171 containers destined for Reunion were offloaded and the vessel was directed to Maputo to pick up cargo from the stricken vessel. The MSC Spain left Durban on 15 December, following a longer route than originally planned. The vessel arrived at Jebel Ali on 10 January 2002 and Damman on 14 January 2002. The litchis had deteriorated due to the delay. Tebe sued the appellant in contract and delict, claiming the appellant negligently failed to advise Tebe of the delay and route change, which would have allowed Tebe to remove the cargo or transship it.
The appeal was upheld with costs, including costs of two counsel. The order of the full court was set aside. The appeal to the full court was dismissed with costs. The trial court's order of absolution from the instance was altered to an order dismissing the action with costs.
An agent of a carrier and shipping line owes no legal duty in delict to inform a shipper or consignee of a proposed deviation or delay where the bill of lading contractually permits such deviation and changes to sailing dates. In determining wrongfulness in cases involving omissions and pure economic loss in a contractual setting, relevant factors include: (1) the extent to which the plaintiff was or could have been protected against the risk of harm by contractual provisions; (2) whether the duty alleged could have arisen in the absence of a contract; and (3) the existence and terms of the contract. Where the parties have contractually allocated risk through provisions permitting deviation and schedule changes, and where the plaintiff would have no claim against the principal for exercising those contractual rights, no delictual duty will be imposed on the principal's agent that would conflict with the agent's contractual obligations to the principal or allow circumvention of the contractual risk allocation. Conduct taking the form of an omission is not prima facie wrongful and requires establishment that it would be reasonable to impose liability for negligence in the circumstances.
The Court noted that the claim in contract was misconceived as the appellant acted at all times as agent, not principal. The Court assumed without deciding that Tebe had locus standi to pursue its claim, given the uncertain nature of the arrangement between Tebe and its supplier (Laughing Waters), which involved aspects of both sale and consignment. The Court expressly declined to consider the question of whether the Himalaya clause would have protected the appellant from liability, stating that its failure to address this issue should not be construed as an endorsement of the views expressed by the court a quo on that matter. The Court observed that the trial court had granted absolution from the instance, but in view of the Court's finding on delictual liability, the appellant was entitled to an order dismissing the claim with costs rather than absolution.
This case establishes important principles regarding the scope of delictual liability of shipping agents in South Africa. It clarifies that an agent of a carrier and shipping line has no legal duty in delict to inform a shipper or consignee of a proposed deviation where the bill of lading permits such deviation. The judgment reinforces the principle that where parties have regulated their relationship by contract, and where contractual provisions permit certain conduct, a delictual duty will not be imposed that would effectively circumvent the contractual allocation of risk. It emphasizes the importance of the contractual setting in determining whether wrongfulness exists in cases of pure economic loss or omissions. The case also illustrates the application of principles regarding when conduct (particularly omissions) will be considered wrongful, requiring consideration of policy factors, the legal convictions of the community, and the contractual context. It demonstrates the courts' reluctance to recognize delictual duties that would conflict with an agent's contractual obligations to its principal or allow a party to circumvent contractual limitations on liability.