The applicant, Mr Paul Francious van Vuren, is serving a sentence of life incarceration at Pretoria Central Correctional Centre. He was convicted in November 1992 of murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances, theft, and possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, and sentenced to death on the murder and robbery counts. Following the Constitutional Court’s decision in S v Makwanyane, the death sentences were commuted in September 2000 to life incarceration, antedated to 13 November 1992. By the time of the High Court proceedings, he had served more than 15 years of his sentence. Mr Van Vuren sought to be considered for parole in accordance with the parole regime, policies and guidelines applicable at the time of his original sentencing, under which lifers could be considered after 10 to 15 years. The Department of Correctional Services maintained that section 136(3)(a) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 required offenders serving life sentences to complete at least 20 years before being eligible for parole consideration. After unsuccessful attempts to secure parole consideration administratively and through prior litigation, Mr Van Vuren brought an urgent application in the North Gauteng High Court seeking, inter alia, a declaration that section 136(3)(a) was unconstitutional and a mandamus compelling consideration for parole under the pre-1998 regime. The High Court dismissed the application. He then applied to the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal and, in the alternative, for direct access.
Leave to appeal was refused. The alternative application for direct access to the Constitutional Court was also refused. Ancillary applications for condonation and non-compliance with the Rules were dismissed as moot.
The case is significant for clarifying the approach of the Constitutional Court to parole eligibility for offenders serving life sentences under the transitional provisions of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. It underscores the Court’s strict application of the ‘interests of justice’ standard for leave to appeal and direct access, particularly in parole and correctional services matters, and confirms the limited circumstances in which constitutional challenges to parole regimes will be entertained.