Sanna Suzan Oliphant v The Road Accident Fund

On 5 December 1999, the appellant was knocked over by her husband's motor vehicle in front of her house, leaving her paraplegic. The incident occurred while her husband, Mr Isaac Ndeleni Oliphant, was investigating a mechanical problem with the vehicle's engine. According to his version, he had started the vehicle using the ignition key and a dashboard button he had installed, heard an unusual noise, switched off the engine, removed the key and placed it in his pocket. While working on a loose nut on the petrol pump, the spanner he was using slipped from his hand and dropped onto two electrical contact points (the positive pole of the starter motor and the positive pole of the solenoid), causing the vehicle to unexpectedly start and reverse, knocking over the appellant. The vehicle had an automatic gearbox that Mr Oliphant had modified so the engine could be started in any gear, not just park. The appellant instituted proceedings in the Free State High Court against the Road Accident Fund for damages arising from her injuries. The trial court (Ebrahim J) heard only the merits and found in favour of the appellant, concluding that her husband's negligence caused the accident. The Fund appealed to the full court, which upheld the appeal.

• Whether the husband's version of how the accident occurred was credible and probable
• Whether negligence on the part of the insured driver (Mr Oliphant) was proved
• Whether the driver could reasonably foresee the possibility of harm resulting from his conduct
• Whether reasonable precautions were taken to prevent the harm from occurring

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) To establish negligence in delict, a plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendant foresaw or ought reasonably to have foreseen the possibility of harm ensuing from his conduct and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent its occurrence. (2) The foreseeability of harm depends on the degree of probability of it occurring. (3) Where an accident occurs through a highly improbable chain of events that were too remote to be reasonably foreseeable (a 'freak accident'), negligence will not be established even if harm results. (4) A person who takes reasonable precautions (such as switching off a vehicle's ignition and removing the key before working on the engine) cannot be found negligent for failing to foresee and guard against a highly improbable series of events leading to an accident. (5) The law does not hold a person culpable for a 'freak accident' that could not reasonably have been foreseen.

Heher JA made an obiter observation that he would assume, without deciding, that the court a quo (the full court) erred in not finding that the appellant proved on a balance of probabilities that she was injured in the circumstances to which her husband testified. This suggests that even if the husband's version were accepted as factually accurate, negligence would still not be proved because no reasonable person in his position would have foreseen the possibility of harm from dropping a spanner into the engine. The court's description of the incident as a 'freak accident' also serves as obiter commentary on the nature of highly unusual accidents for which the law ought not to impose liability. The detailed analysis of the improbabilities in Mr Oliphant's version (including the reference to the ignition switch possibly being worn but the steering lock being engaged, the gear selector being difficult to manipulate, and the vehicle normally being slow to move) contains obiter observations about the factual assessment, though these supported the ultimate ratio on negligence.

This case is significant in South African delictual law as it illustrates the application of the test for negligence in unusual or 'freak accident' circumstances. It demonstrates that even where harm occurs, liability in delict will not be established unless both elements of negligence are proved: reasonable foreseeability of harm and failure to take reasonable precautions. The case confirms that the law does not impose liability for accidents that occur through an unforeseeable chain of events, even where the outcome is tragic. It also demonstrates the court's approach to assessing the credibility and probability of evidence in motor vehicle accident claims, particularly where the plaintiff's case depends heavily on the version of the insured driver given years after the event. The judgment reinforces that claims against the Road Accident Fund must meet the ordinary requirements for proving delictual liability, including negligence on the part of the driver.