City of Johannesburg v Dladla

The respondents (occupiers) were evicted from a dilapidated building in Saratoga Avenue, Berea, Johannesburg pursuant to court orders (the "Blue Moonlight" case). The Constitutional Court ordered the City of Johannesburg to provide temporary accommodation to the evictees by 1 April 2012. The City engaged Metropolitan Evangelical Services (MES) to provide temporary accommodation at Ekuthuleni Shelter. The Shelter had house rules requiring: (1) entry by 20h00 and signing of a nightly register (rule 3); (2) vacating the premises by 8h00 on weekdays and 9h00 on weekends (rule 4); and (3) gender-separated dormitories sleeping 2-4 persons each. The occupiers challenged rules 3 and 4, and the gender separation policy preventing them from sleeping with spouses/life partners, as unconstitutional infringements of their rights to dignity, freedom, security of person and privacy. The Shelter was designed as a "managed care model" for short-term accommodation for the destitute, not for families requiring temporary housing. It provided facilities including meals, ablution facilities, communal areas, security, and skills training. By the time of the appeal, only 11 occupiers remained out of the original 33. Only one married couple was among the occupiers.

• Whether rules 3 and 4 of the Ekuthuleni Shelter house rules (concerning curfew times and daily departure requirements) constitute an unjustifiable infringement of the occupiers' constitutional rights to dignity, freedom, security of person and privacy
• Whether the policy of gender-separated dormitories preventing spouses and permanent life partners from sleeping together in temporary emergency accommodation constitutes an unconstitutional infringement of the occupiers' rights to dignity and privacy
• Whether the nature of temporary emergency accommodation requires different constitutional standards than permanent housing
• Whether the limitation of constitutional rights in the context of emergency temporary accommodation is reasonable and justifiable

The appeal was upheld. The order of the Gauteng Local Division was set aside and replaced with an order dismissing the application. No costs order was made.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Temporary emergency accommodation provided pursuant to an eviction order is fundamentally different from permanent housing and is subject to different constitutional standards; (2) Constitutional rights including dignity, freedom of movement, privacy, and the right of spouses to cohabit may be reasonably limited in the context of temporary emergency accommodation where such limitations are necessary for safety, protection, cost management, and the practical operation of emergency shelters; (3) Emergency accommodation by its nature will fall short of standards expected of permanent housing, and those occupying such accommodation must accept less than what would ordinarily be acceptable; (4) Rules governing temporary emergency shelters (such as curfews, daily departure requirements, and gender-separated dormitories) are not unreasonable or unconstitutional where they serve legitimate purposes including safety, encouraging self-sufficiency, managing costs, and maintaining decency and decorum in multi-occupancy facilities; (5) The proper remedy for occupiers dissatisfied with temporary emergency accommodation is to seek alternative accommodation that meets their needs, not to challenge the reasonable rules of bona fide institutions providing emergency shelter; (6) Municipal compliance with court orders to provide temporary accommodation must be assessed against the reality of limited resources and the vast scale of housing backlogs, and municipalities are entitled to use existing emergency shelter facilities even if not specifically designed for evictees.

The court made several non-binding observations: (1) The court acknowledged that ordinarily, all persons in South Africa have constitutional rights to freedom of movement, and husbands, wives and permanent life partners have constitutional rights to live together, even recognizing this principle from the apartheid-era case of Komani; (2) The court noted approvingly the Constitutional Court's statement in Bernstein that a "very high level of protection is given to the individual's intimate personal sphere of life" but emphasized the qualification that this intimate core is narrowly construed and becomes subject to limitation once activities acquire a social dimension; (3) The court referenced the injunction in Dawood that cohabitation is a central aspect of marriage and significant impairment would limit dignity rights; (4) The court observed that no constitutional right is absolute, citing Coetzee; (5) The court commented that husbands, wives and permanent life partners "do not have the right, always and everywhere, to sleep together" as there are instances where this must yield to broader practical demands; (6) The court noted approvingly that South African housing law and policy "is abreast of the best in the world" and goes further to protect the socially disadvantaged than any other country; (7) The court observed that evaluation of housing policy involves multiple factors and takes place on a different footing from judgment in temporary emergency situations; (8) The court made general observations about worldwide urbanization and the influx of people to cities seeking better lives, and the resulting housing challenges facing developing countries.

This case establishes important principles regarding the provision of temporary emergency accommodation by municipalities and the applicable constitutional standards. It clarifies that temporary emergency accommodation is subject to different standards than permanent housing, and that constitutional rights may be reasonably limited in emergency accommodation contexts. The judgment provides guidance on the scope of municipal obligations under eviction orders requiring provision of temporary accommodation, confirming that emergency accommodation need not meet the same standards as permanent housing. It balances socio-economic rights with the practical constraints facing municipalities dealing with housing shortages and limited resources. The case also demonstrates the limits of constitutional challenges to rules of institutions providing emergency accommodation, suggesting that dissatisfied occupiers should seek alternative accommodation rather than striking down reasonable institutional rules. This has important implications for how municipalities across South Africa approach their constitutional obligations regarding emergency accommodation following evictions.