M Fredericks and 47 Others v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape and Others

The applicants were 48 teachers employed by the Department of Education in the Eastern Cape. In 1996, they applied for voluntary retrenchment under Resolution 3, an agreement reached at the Education Labour Relations Council that provided for voluntary severance packages. Initially such applications were granted, but from December 1996 the Department refused applications without giving reasons or consulting applicants or trade unions. The applicants sought to challenge the refusal in the Eastern Cape High Court, claiming breach of their constitutional rights to equality (section 9) and administrative justice (section 33). The High Court held it lacked jurisdiction, finding that the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995, ousted its jurisdiction as the dispute concerned interpretation or application of a collective agreement under section 24 of that Act.

• Whether the applicants' claim raised a 'constitutional matter' within the meaning of sections 167 and 169 of the Constitution
• Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to determine constitutional matters arising from employment relationships
• Whether section 24 of the Labour Relations Act ousted the High Court's jurisdiction to determine constitutional disputes arising from collective agreements
• Whether the CCMA constitutes 'a court of a status similar to a High Court' for purposes of section 169 of the Constitution
• Whether section 157 of the Labour Relations Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court in respect of constitutional challenges to state conduct as employer
• The proper interpretation of the transitional provisions in Schedule 7 of the Labour Relations Act relating to education sector agreements

1. The application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court was granted. 2. The appeal was upheld and the order made by the High Court in the Eastern Cape was set aside. 3. The matter was referred back to the High Court. 4. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal jointly and severally, including the costs of two counsel.

1. A claim based on alleged infringement of constitutional rights (sections 9 and 33) by the state acting as employer constitutes a "constitutional matter" for purposes of sections 167 and 169 of the Constitution, regardless of whether the claim also relates to employment or a collective agreement. 2. Section 169 of the Constitution constitutionally entrenches the High Court's jurisdiction to determine constitutional matters. This jurisdiction can only be ousted where Parliament assigns the constitutional matter to another court of similar status to the High Court. 3. The CCMA is not a court of similar status to the High Court. Section 24 of the Labour Relations Act, which requires disputes about collective agreements to be conciliated and arbitrated by the CCMA, cannot constitutionally oust the High Court's jurisdiction to determine constitutional matters arising from such agreements. 4. Section 157(1) of the Labour Relations Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court only over matters that the Act specifically provides "are to be determined" by the Labour Court. There is no general exclusive jurisdiction over all employment-related matters. 5. Section 157(2) expressly provides for concurrent jurisdiction between the Labour Court and High Court over constitutional challenges to state conduct as employer. This cannot be interpreted as conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court. 6. Where a statute provides specialist dispute resolution mechanisms for employment disputes but does not expressly assign constitutional matters to a court of similar status, the High Court retains jurisdiction to determine constitutional challenges.

1. The Court noted that while it was not deciding whether Resolution 3 constituted a "collective agreement" for purposes of the Labour Relations Act, there were strong indications that it should be deemed one, despite its promulgation by the Minister under the Education Labour Relations Act. 2. The Court observed that its conclusions did not mean persons with constitutional complaints arising from collective agreements could not take matters to the CCMA, nor that the CCMA should not consider constitutional provisions - indeed, as an organ of state it is obliged to give effect to constitutional commitments. 3. The Court expressly noted it was not addressing the question whether disputes arising from collective agreements give rise to constitutional complaints under section 23(1) (the right to fair labour practices), as the applicants expressly disavowed reliance on that provision. This was stated to raise "difficult issues of constitutional interpretation" left for another day. 4. The Court commented on the interpretation of the transitional provisions in Schedule 7 of the Labour Relations Act, distinguishing between the treatment of industrial council agreements (item 12(1)(a)) and education sector agreements (item 12(2)), concluding that the latter were subject to the new Act's dispute resolution procedures for disputes arising after the Act came into force. 5. O'Regan J noted that deciding the extent to which the state acting as employer is obliged to comply with sections 9 and 33 was not necessary for determination of the jurisdictional issue.

This case is significant in South African jurisprudence because it clarifies the constitutional protection of the High Court's jurisdiction over constitutional matters under section 169 of the Constitution. It establishes that Parliament may only oust the High Court's jurisdiction over constitutional matters by assigning them to a court of similar status, and that the CCMA is not such a court. The judgment confirms that employees of the state may bring constitutional challenges to the state's conduct as employer directly to the High Court, notwithstanding the comprehensive dispute resolution mechanisms in the Labour Relations Act. It distinguishes between disputes based on constitutional rights (which remain within High Court jurisdiction) and disputes based purely on employment contracts or labour law (which may be assigned to specialist labour forums). The decision also clarifies the interpretation of section 157 of the Labour Relations Act, establishing that the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction under section 157(1) is limited to matters the Act specifically requires it to determine, and that section 157(2) preserves concurrent High Court jurisdiction over constitutional matters arising from employment.