The matter came before the High Court on special review from the Regional Court, Fort Beaufort. The accused was a child who was 12 years old at the time of the alleged offence and 14 years old at the time of trial. He was charged with murder arising from a stabbing of another 14-year-old boy. When the charge of murder was put, the child, who was legally represented, indicated that he intended to plead guilty only to the competent verdict of culpable homicide. A statement in terms of s 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was handed in, in which the child admitted unlawfully and negligently stabbing the deceased but denied any intention to kill. The prosecutor accepted the plea to culpable homicide. The magistrate rejected the plea, engaged in an off-record discussion in chambers, and thereafter accepted written admissions under s 220 of the CPA in which the child admitted stabbing the deceased and foreseeing the possibility of death. The magistrate ultimately convicted the child of murder. Criminal capacity in terms of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 was never proved, and the presiding officer did not personally comply with the mandatory explanations required by s 63(3) of the Child Justice Act. The child had not yet been sentenced when the matter was reviewed.
The proceedings and conviction for murder were reviewed and set aside. If the prosecuting authority elects to prosecute the child de novo, the matter must be heard by a different magistrate. The Registrar was directed to forward the judgment to the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions, Makhanda, and to Legal Aid South Africa.
This case underscores the strict procedural protections afforded to children under the Child Justice Act, particularly the presumption of lack of criminal capacity for children aged 12 to 14. It reaffirms that once the State accepts a plea to a competent verdict, the court cannot reject it and reintroduce a more serious charge. The judgment highlights the duty of presiding officers to personally comply with statutory obligations when dealing with child accused and confirms that failure to prove criminal capacity is a fatal defect.