On 14 January 2004, Cell C (the appellant), a cellular phone service provider, delivered a community service container with telephones and equipment to Zulu (the respondent) after he paid an agreed sum. Cell C provided a cellular phone signal to enable the respondent to offer telecommunication services to the public. This delivery and provision of signal occurred before a written contract was signed by an authorized representative of Cell C. The respondent had applied on 19 September 2003 for a community service facility, which was received by Jabu Mary Sekete, an employee who could only provisionally approve applications. Payment of R28,400 and R100 was made in October-November 2003. On 13 January 2004, the respondent was provided with a copy of the written agreement to sign after consulting his attorney. A dispute arose on 14 January 2004 about the site location - the respondent claimed entitlement to 2526 Sinkwazi Road, Imbali, while Sekete claimed another location. By compromise, the container was delivered to the respondent's place of residence in the interim. On 3 February 2004, the respondent moved the container to 2526 Sinkwazi Road, Imbali. On the same day, Cell C deactivated the cellular lines without notice, preventing calls from being made or received. The respondent obtained a rule nisi on 5 February 2004 ordering restoration of service.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The rule nisi obtained by the respondent was confirmed, ordering the appellant to restore the telecommunication line to the container and interdicting the appellant from unlawfully terminating or suspending such service. The appellant's counter-application was dismissed.
Where parties conclude an interim agreement (established by inference from their conduct such as payment, delivery, and commencement of performance) pending execution of a formal written contract, and the interim agreement contains no express provision as to how it may be cancelled, reasonable notice of cancellation must be given by the party seeking to terminate. A party cannot lawfully cancel such an interim agreement without giving reasonable notice. The existence of an interim agreement can be established by inference from the conduct of the parties, including payment of contract price, delivery of goods/services, and commencement of business operations.
The court noted that it was not necessary to determine what period would have constituted reasonable notice in the circumstances of this case, given the concession that no notice whatsoever had been given. The court also observed that the finding against the appellant on the cancellation issue rendered it unnecessary to consider the alternative ground of spoliation, though the lower court had found in favor of the respondent on that issue as well.
This case is significant in South African contract law for establishing important principles regarding interim agreements concluded by conduct before formal written contracts are executed. It clarifies that parties can be bound by enforceable agreements based on their conduct (payment, delivery, commencement of performance) even where a formal written agreement is contemplated but not yet signed. Importantly, the case establishes that where an interim agreement lacks express termination provisions, a party cannot unilaterally terminate without reasonable notice. This protects parties who have begun performing obligations in good faith from arbitrary termination of their contractual rights. The case reinforces the principle that courts will imply reasonable terms into contracts to give them business efficacy and fairness, particularly regarding notice requirements for termination.