Mr Bongani Masuku, the first appellant, and COSATU, the second appellant, made statements in the context of strong worldwide reaction following a military operation launched by the armed forces of the State of Israel on Hamas during December 2008 and January 2009. Mr Masuku made statements online declaring that 'every Zionist must be made to drink the bitter medicine they are feeding our brothers and sisters in Palestine' and calling to 'target them, expose them and do all that is needed to subject them to perpetual suffering'. At a gathering held at Wits University, he stated that 'COSATU has got members here on this campus, we can make sure that for that side it will be hell' and warned that 'any South African family who sends its son or daughter to be part of the Israeli Defence Force must not blame us when something happens to them'. The South African Human Rights Commission brought proceedings in the Equality Court, which found that these statements constituted hate speech and ordered Mr Masuku to apologise to the Jewish Community.
The appeal was upheld. The order of the Equality Court declaring the statements to be hate speech and requiring Mr Masuku to apologise to the Jewish Community was set aside.
The binding legal principle established is that for speech to fall outside the protection of section 16(1) of the Constitution, it must constitute advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion as contemplated in section 16(2). Statements that are offensive, hurtful, unpalatable or insulting do not automatically constitute hate speech and remain constitutionally protected. Speech must be interpreted in the context in which it was made, including the circumstances and events that provoked it. Criticism of a political ideology (such as Zionism) is distinct from hatred directed at an ethnic or religious group (such as Jewish people) and the two must not be conflated without proper contextual analysis.
The Court made observations about the importance of freedom of expression in South Africa's constitutional democracy and the necessity of protecting robust political speech, particularly speech relating to international political conflicts and solidarity movements. The judgment implicitly recognizes that speech made in the context of political protest and advocacy for oppressed peoples, while potentially offensive to some, plays an important role in democratic discourse and should not readily be classified as hate speech unless it clearly meets the stringent criteria set out in section 16(2) of the Constitution.
This case is significant in South African jurisprudence as it clarifies the boundaries between protected freedom of expression and hate speech. It establishes that even offensive, hurtful, unpalatable or insulting speech remains constitutionally protected unless it constitutes advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion as contemplated in section 16(2) of the Constitution. The judgment emphasizes the importance of interpreting statements in their proper context and distinguishes between criticism of political ideologies (such as Zionism) and hatred directed at ethnic or religious groups (such as Jewish people). The case reinforces the high threshold required for speech to be classified as unprotected hate speech and the primacy of freedom of expression in South Africa's constitutional democracy.