Jansen J granted an Anton Piller order (a preservation of evidence order) in the Port Elizabeth High Court. The appellants subsequently applied to Liebenberg J for the setting aside of this order. Liebenberg J dismissed the application to set aside the Anton Piller order on the basis that the order was not appealable. The appellants applied for leave to appeal against Liebenberg J's order, which was refused on the grounds that the order was not appealable. The appellants then sought and obtained leave to appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The appeal was struck from the roll with costs, including the costs occasioned by the employment of two counsel. The order of Liebenberg J dismissing the application to set aside the Anton Piller order was effectively upheld on the basis that it was not appealable.
The grant of an Anton Piller order is not appealable because such an order does not meet the three requirements for appealability established in Zweni v Minister of Law and Order: (1) it is not final in effect as it may be susceptible to alteration; (2) it is not definitive of the substantive rights of the parties; and (3) it does not dispose of any substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main proceedings. An Anton Piller order is a procedural remedy directed at the preservation of evidence that serves only to assist in other proceedings where substantive relief is claimed. It is akin to an interim interdict, the grant of which has been established as not appealable. Consequently, an order dismissing an application to set aside an Anton Piller order is also not appealable.
The court noted that the question of appealability has 'presented persisting complexity' and 'vexed the minds of eminent lawyers for many centuries'. The underlying policy consideration is the undesirability of piecemeal appellate disposal of issues in litigation and the general advisability of limiting appeals to certain orders. The court observed that where the approach against piecemeal appeals has been relaxed, it has been because judicial decisions had all three attributes referred to in Zweni. The court also noted that it is generally unnecessarily expensive and undesirable for issues to be resolved by different courts at different times rather than by the same court at one time. The court quoted extensively from Knox D'Arcy regarding the historical development and justification for the distinction between the appealability of refusals versus grants of interim interdicts, noting practical and theoretical differences including that an appeal against the grant of a temporary interdict would often be inconsistent with the very purpose of the remedy.
This case is significant in South African civil procedure law as it definitively establishes that the grant of an Anton Piller order (preservation of evidence order) is not appealable. It affirms the principle against piecemeal appellate disposal of litigation issues and confirms that Anton Piller orders are procedural in nature, aimed at preserving evidence rather than determining substantive rights. The judgment applies and extends the established principle that the grant (as opposed to the refusal) of interim interdicts is not appealable to the context of Anton Piller orders. This promotes efficiency in litigation by preventing interlocutory appeals that would delay the main proceedings and frustrate the very purpose of preservation orders.