The appellants were suppliers who obtained approximately 400 judgments against the Road Accident Fund (RAF) for third-party supplier claims under s 17(5) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. In March 2023, sheriffs served writs of execution on the RAF and attached its assets for sale in execution. Some of these judgments were granted by consent, some as long ago as 2008, and some had already been paid in part or in full. The RAF approached the high court seeking to stay the writs of execution and compel the appellants to provide identity documents of injured persons and accident report forms in terms of s 24 of the RAF Act, despite judgments already having been granted. The RAF argued it needed this information to verify claims and prevent fraudulent or duplicate payments, asserting the claims were not properly lodged without this information. The high court granted the RAF's application, directing the appellants to provide the information and staying the writs pending the provision of information or the institution of rescission applications. The appellants appealed.
The appeal was upheld with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so employed. The order of the high court was set aside and replaced with an order dismissing the application with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so employed.
Section 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 prescribes pre-summons procedures and cannot be invoked to compel a judgment creditor to provide information after final judgment has been pronounced. A court order, once granted, is final and binding unless set aside on appeal or rescission. A court has no authority to reopen the lis by directing compliance with pre-litigation statutory requirements after judgment, as this offends the principle of finality of court orders and the functus officio doctrine. The inherent power of courts under s 173 of the Constitution to regulate their process does not extend to substantive rights and cannot be used to override the principle of finality of judgments except in rare and exceptional circumstances where significant or manifest injustice would result. For suspension of execution under rule 45A, an applicant must establish the usual requisites for an interdict including a prima facie right, which requires demonstrating that the underlying causa of the judgment is disputed or that there are prospects of success in rescission proceedings. Where the RAF has not objected to a claim within 60 days as required by s 24(5) of the RAF Act, the claim is deemed valid in all respects and cannot subsequently be challenged on the basis of non-compliance with s 24 requirements.
The Court acknowledged that the RAF faces formidable institutional and systemic problems, including improper and fraudulent claims that drain its resources. The Court commended the RAF for revisiting its internal processes but cautioned that this cannot be at the expense of litigants against whom there is no evidence of fraud. While the high court's order was well-intended and motivated by a desire to assist the RAF in performing its statutory functions, it was not founded on legal principle or supported by the facts. The Court emphasised that the list of exceptions to the functus officio rule is not exhaustive and courts have discretionary power to vary orders in appropriate cases, but this power should be very sparingly exercised to preserve the principle of finality in litigation. The Court noted that organs of state are obliged to litigate responsibly and fairly, and found no basis for concluding that the RAF acted maliciously or with ulterior motives despite the appellants' criticism. The Court observed that the RAF had not filed rescission applications almost 17 months after the high court order, with no indication of when it intended to do so.
This case is significant in South African law for reinforcing the fundamental principle of finality of court orders and the functus officio doctrine. It establishes clear boundaries on when a court may exercise its inherent powers under s 173 of the Constitution, confirming that such powers do not extend to reopening the lis or requiring compliance with pre-litigation statutory procedures after final judgment has been granted. The judgment provides important guidance on the interpretation of s 24 of the Road Accident Fund Act, confirming that it applies only at the pre-summons stage and that claims not objected to within 60 days are deemed valid in all respects. The case clarifies that even organs of state facing institutional challenges and concerns about fraud cannot circumvent the requirement to follow proper legal procedures (appeal or rescission) to challenge final court orders. It is also significant in the context of the Road Accident Fund's ongoing challenges with supplier claims, balancing the need for verification against the rights of judgment creditors.
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