The first respondent (plaintiff) brought a civil action for damages against the applicant (defendant) arising from a veld fire that spread from the applicant's land (outside a fire control area) to the respondent's neighboring farm, destroying orchards and pasturage. The action was instituted in the Transvaal Provincial Division. Section 84 of the Forest Act 122 of 1984 provided that when the question of negligence arose in any action concerning a veld, forest or mountain fire occurring on land outside a fire control area, negligence was presumed until the contrary was proved. This reverse onus provision meant the applicant had to disprove negligence rather than the plaintiff proving it. The applicant challenged the constitutionality of section 84, arguing it violated: (1) the right to equality before the law and equal protection (section 8(1) of the interim Constitution); (2) the prohibition against unfair discrimination (section 8(2)); and (3) the presumption of innocence in criminal trials (section 25(3)(c)). Van der Walt DJP referred the constitutional question to the Constitutional Court in terms of section 102(1) of the interim Constitution, finding it was decisive for how the parties would conduct their cases.
The Constitutional Court declared that section 84 of the Forest Act 122 of 1984 is not inconsistent with the interim Constitution. The case was referred back to the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court to be dealt with in light of this judgment. No order as to costs was made, as the parties had agreed none should be made.
This case is a foundational decision in South African equality jurisprudence. It established the framework for analyzing section 8 of the interim Constitution (and by extension similar provisions in the final Constitution). Key principles established include: (1) The distinction between 'mere differentiation' (requiring rational relationship to governmental purpose) and 'unfair discrimination' (requiring additional element of dignity impairment or comparable harm); (2) The principle that unfair discrimination under section 8(2) principally means treating persons differently in a way that impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings; (3) Recognition that differentiation is inevitable in legislation and not all differentiation constitutes unconstitutional inequality; (4) The approach that equality doctrine should develop incrementally and case-by-case rather than through sweeping interpretations; (5) Application of section 35(2) interpretive principle to prefer constitutional validity where reasonable interpretation permits; (6) Clarification that section 98(5) limits declarations of invalidity to the extent of inconsistency. The case also confirmed the legitimacy of reverse onus provisions in civil matters where rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives, distinguishing civil and criminal onus requirements. It demonstrated judicial deference to legislative judgment on policy matters involving social and economic regulation where rational basis exists.