Chairperson of the Western Cape Gambling and Racing Board and Others v Goldrush Group Management (Pty) Ltd and Another

The Western Cape Gambling and Racing Board (the Board) established the limited payout gambling machine (LPM) sector in the province in 2004. It issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) inviting applications for route operator licences, intending to appoint three operators and allocate 1000 LPMs to each (3000 total). The RFP reserved the right to appoint fewer operators and, if so, to allocate additional LPMs proportionally to those appointed, or to re-advertise. The Board received five applications and appointed only two route operators: V-Slots and Grand Slots, allocating 1000 LPMs to each, leaving 1000 LPMs unallocated. In 2017, V-Slots and Grand Slots requested the remaining LPMs. On 29 August 2017, the Board allocated the remaining 1000 LPMs equally to them (500 each). Goldrush Group Management (Pty) Ltd (Goldrush), a company specializing in gambling industry management but holding no licence in the Western Cape, learned of this allocation in late 2018. In March 2019, Goldrush launched a review application seeking to set aside the Board's 2017 decision, arguing the Board should have advertised the remaining LPMs and allowed other parties to apply. The high court found Goldrush lacked own-interest standing but proceeded on the basis of the interests of justice, finding the decision unlawful and setting it aside. The Board and the two operators appealed.

• Whether Goldrush had standing (locus standi) to bring the review application based on its own interest
• Whether the interests of justice required the court to overlook Goldrush's lack of standing
• Whether Goldrush's delay in bringing the review application was unreasonable and should bar the review
• Whether the Board's decision to allocate the remaining LPMs to existing licenced operators without advertising was lawful and within its powers under the RFP and applicable legislation

The appeal was upheld with costs, including costs of two counsel where employed. The high court order setting aside the Board's decision was set aside and replaced with an order dismissing the application with costs, including costs of two counsel where employed.

A party asserting own-interest standing in an administrative review must show that the specific decision under challenge had the capacity to affect its own legal rights or interests. The 'interests of justice' exception that permits adjudication despite lack of standing applies only where there is at least a strong indication of fraud or other gross irregularity in the conduct of a public body, or where the public interest cries out for relief. A party who seeks to review a decision taken pursuant to a policy framework (such as an RFP) must challenge the lawfulness of that framework; failure to do so is fatal where the administrative body acted in accordance with powers it reserved in that framework. An administrative body acts lawfully when it exercises powers in accordance with reservations and policy objectives expressly set out in its licensing processes.

The Court noted that allocation of LPMs to licensed operators requires no separate licensing process - LPMs can only be allocated to operators who have already been licensed. The high court erred in treating the allocation as involving 'additional licences'. The Court also observed that the high court's approach of conferring standing because it found the review should succeed on the merits was fundamentally wrong - standing is a threshold issue of procedural justiciability that must be determined before the merits. The judgment emphasized that a party's commercial interest in potentially applying for a license in the future, based on experience and likelihood of success, is speculative and hypothetical and does not constitute an own-interest that is affected by allocation decisions concerning existing licensees.

This judgment provides important clarification on standing requirements in administrative review proceedings, particularly in the context of regulatory decisions affecting commercial interests. It reinforces the principle from Giant Concerts that an applicant asserting own-interest standing must show the decision has the capacity to affect its own legal rights or interests. The case demonstrates that the 'interests of justice' exception permitting adjudication despite questionable standing applies only in narrow circumstances involving fraud, gross irregularity, or conduct that 'cries out' for investigation in the public interest. The judgment also confirms that administrative bodies may lawfully act in accordance with reservations and policy objectives set out in their licensing processes, and that failure to challenge the lawfulness of an underlying policy framework (such as an RFP) is fatal to a review of decisions taken pursuant to that framework. It distinguishes between licensing processes (which may require advertisement) and allocation decisions to existing licensees (which may not). The case has implications for gambling regulation and more broadly for challenges to allocation decisions by parties who were not part of the initial selection process.