In 1983, Markplaas (Edms) Bpk (a private company) was established by Smuts and Roux as equal shareholders and sole directors. In 1993, Roux secretly sold his shareholding to Booyens for R250,000 without complying with the pre-emptive rights provisions in Markplaas's articles of association (articles 21-24 of Table B of Schedule 1 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973). These articles required Roux to first offer his shares to existing shareholders before selling to third parties. Roux was sequestrated in September 1994 and the sequestration order was confirmed in October 1994. On 29 November 1994, Roux delivered the share certificate to Booyens. The curator of Roux's insolvent estate, together with Smuts, applied to set aside the sale agreement. Du Plessis J granted absolution from the instance, finding that the articles created only personal rights and that proof of Booyens's knowledge of the pre-emptive right was required. Booyens then brought a motion application under section 115 of the Companies Act for rectification of the members' register. Coetzee Acting J granted the application, finding Booyens had become entitled to the shares through the sale agreement.
In case A/222/99: (1) Appeal allowed with costs, including costs of two counsel, but excluding costs of one-third of the record. (2) Order of the court a quo set aside and replaced with: (i) Application referred for trial succeeds with costs; (ii) Declaration that 50% of shares in Markplaas (Edms) Bpk vest in the curator of the insolvent estate of P S Roux, Estate Number T3163/94. In case 257/99: (1) Appeal allowed with costs, including costs of two counsel. (2) Order of the court a quo set aside and replaced with: Application dismissed with costs.
Shares in a private company cannot be transferred in contravention of transfer restrictions contained in the company's articles of association, even to a third party who has no knowledge of such restrictions. Section 20(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 requires that a private company's articles restrict "the right" to transfer shares, which encompasses the entire transfer process including the agreement to transfer, execution of transfer deed, and registration. Pre-emptive rights provisions in articles (such as articles 21-24 of Table B) constitute an essential characteristic of the shares themselves and create an implied pactum de non cedendo (agreement not to transfer). Where the prescribed procedure in the articles is not followed, the shares lack the attribute of transmissibility from inception, and no rights can be transferred to a purchaser. The knowledge of the purchaser regarding the restrictions is irrelevant to their enforceability.
The court made several additional observations: (1) Cameron JA noted that although the trial could have been significantly shortened or eliminated by having the dispute determined as a stated case, Booyens's conduct partly contributed to the proceedings taking the form they did. (2) The court commented that section 115 of the Companies Act is hardly an appropriate remedy to obtain or grant transfer of shares in motion proceedings where factual disputes arise that cannot be resolved on the papers, citing Verrin Trust & Finance Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Zeeland House (Pty) Ltd. (3) The court found it unnecessary to decide several alternative arguments raised by Smuts, including: whether there was a valid transfer transaction on the facts (relying on Botha v Fick); whether if there was a cession, it transferred diminished rights to Booyens (by analogy to Van der Berg v Transkei Development Corporation); whether knowledge of the contents of Markplaas's articles should be imputed to Booyens as a matter of law (relying on Abrahamse v Connock's Pension Fund); and whether absolution from the instance was in any event wrongly granted in the circumstances. (4) Cameron JA also noted the importance for shareholders in a private company, where the entire structure is designed to keep control within a limited circle of approved members, of knowing who their fellow members are, even in predominantly or purely commercial relationships.
This judgment is a leading authority on share transfer restrictions in private companies under South African company law. It establishes that pre-emptive rights and transfer restrictions in a private company's articles are not merely procedural or contractual formalities, but constitute substantive limitations on the transmissibility of shares that form part of the essential nature of the shares themselves. The decision affirms that private companies exist precisely to maintain control within a limited circle of approved members, and that this purpose is protected by making transfer restrictions enforceable against third parties regardless of their knowledge. The case clarifies the interpretation of section 20(1)(a) and section 91 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, establishing that these provisions create statutory impediments to transfers that do not comply with the articles. It represents an important application of the principle that shares in a company are statutory creations whose nature and extent are determined by legislation, not merely by contract. The judgment also provides guidance on the inappropriate use of section 115 rectification applications where material factual disputes exist.