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The accused was found guilty of dealing in three methaqualone tablets (commonly known as Mandrax), an undesirable dependency-producing substance, in contravention of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act No. 140 of 1992. The conviction was based on section 21(1)(a)(iii) of the Act, which created a presumption that if an accused was found in possession of any amount of an undesirable dependency-producing substance, it was presumed, until the contrary was proven, that the accused dealt in such substance. The magistrate who presided over the trial in Paarl, the Cape Provincial Division of the High Court that referred the matter, and the Western Cape Attorney-General all believed the provision was unconstitutional. The matter was referred to the Constitutional Court as it had exclusive jurisdiction to declare Acts of Parliament unconstitutional.

• Whether section 21(1)(a)(iii) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act No. 140 of 1992 is constitutionally compatible with the interim Constitution
• Whether the reverse onus created by the presumption violates the presumption of innocence and the right to silence in section 25(3)(c) of the interim Constitution
• Whether the provision can be saved by the limitations clause in section 33(1) of the interim Constitution
• What appropriate remedy should be granted if the provision is found to be unconstitutional

The Court ordered that: (a) Section 21(1)(a)(iii) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act No. 140 of 1992 is incompatible with the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 200 of 1993 and is declared invalid and of no force with effect from the date of the judgment; (b) In terms of section 98(6) of the interim Constitution, the declaration of invalidity applies to the application of the said subsection in any criminal case where the conviction occurred after the commencement of the Constitution and an appeal or review is pending on the date of this judgment or can still be timeously noted; and (c) The case was referred back to the Cape Provincial Division of the High Court for disposal in accordance with this judgment.

A statutory presumption that a person found in possession of any amount of an undesirable dependency-producing substance is presumed to have dealt in that substance violates the presumption of innocence and right to silence protected by section 25(3)(c) of the interim Constitution. Such a presumption places an evidentiary burden on an accused that is not rationally connected to the basic fact proved (mere possession), as possession of even a minimal quantity provides no rational indication of an intention to deal rather than for personal use. The provision cannot be saved under the limitations clause in section 33(1) of the interim Constitution.

The Court noted that the reverse onus in this case was even more problematic than in the dagga case (S v Bhulwana) because it was triggered by possession of any amount of the substance, rather than requiring possession of a threshold quantity. The Court observed that according to no conceivable logic could possession of, for example, half a Mandrax tablet in itself indicate to a rational person that the possessor had any particular intention with it. The Court also noted that all parties (the referring court, the Attorney-General, and the magistrate) agreed that the provision was unconstitutional, and the referral was made merely because the Constitutional Court had exclusive jurisdiction to declare parliamentary legislation unconstitutional.

This case is significant because it extended the Constitutional Court's reasoning in S v Bhulwana to strike down another reverse onus provision in drug trafficking legislation. It affirmed that statutory presumptions that require an accused to disprove dealing in drugs based solely on possession of any quantity of a substance, without any rational connection between the basic fact (possession) and the presumed fact (dealing), violate the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. The case demonstrates the Court's commitment to protecting fair trial rights even in the context of serious crimes like drug trafficking, and shows that policy considerations alone cannot justify unconstitutional reverse onus provisions. It also illustrates the Court's approach to remedies, balancing justice for those who successfully challenge unconstitutional provisions while limiting disruption to the administration of justice by applying the invalidity prospectively with limited retrospective effect.