On 16 May 2014, Mrs Mashinini, a 39-year-old professional nurse at Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital, underwent a laparoscopic cholecystectomy (gallbladder removal) at Tambo Memorial Hospital, Boksburg. During the procedure she sustained a major bile duct and hepatic artery injury requiring emergency management, attempted endoscopic management, and bile duct reconstruction at Greys Hospital, Pietermaritzburg. She underwent various surgical procedures to correct the damage. On 18 January 2017 she instituted an action for damages based on medical negligence against the MEC for Health and Social Development, Gauteng, claiming past and future medical expenses, future loss of earnings, and general damages. The MEC conceded liability but raised a 'public healthcare defence', pleading that the court should develop the common law to order future medical treatment be provided at a state hospital instead of monetary compensation. Expert evidence established that Mrs Mashinini would require future medical treatment costing R879,314 (after 15% contingency) if provided privately. The experts agreed on the nature and extent of treatment required. Professor Bizos, a Gastro Intestinal Surgeon, testified that Mrs Mashinini's case was complex requiring direct access to specialist surgeons, which state hospitals could not guarantee due to resource constraints, waiting periods, and the first-come-first-served casualty system. No contrary evidence was adduced by the MEC.
The appeal was upheld with costs including costs of two counsel. The high court order was set aside and replaced with judgment for the plaintiff for: (a) payment of R3,213,564.40; (b) interest on that sum at the prevailing legal interest rate from date of judgment to final payment; (c) costs of suit including reasonable costs of medico-legal reports, joint minutes, and expert witness fees; (d) the claim for past hospital and medical expenses was postponed sine die.
Where a plaintiff in a delictual action for medical negligence establishes prima facie proof of the reasonable and necessary cost of future medical expenses through appropriate evidence, the defendant who raises a 'public healthcare defence' bears an evidential burden to rebut that prima facie case. To discharge this burden, the defendant must adduce cogent evidence establishing that medical services of the same or acceptably high standard will be available to the plaintiff at no cost or for less than that claimed. This must include evidence of the quality, accessibility, and cost of the proposed alternative state healthcare services. Absent such evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation for future medical expenses at the private healthcare rates established in evidence. This operates within existing Aquilian principles and does not require development of the common law.
The court observed that the high court in MSM obo KBM v MEC for Health, Gauteng erred in holding that it was developing the common law when granting an order for provision of services in kind. That order was in fact based on delictual principles where the MEC had discharged the evidential burden by proving that equivalent services were available at the state hospital, and was consented to by the defendant to reduce the monetary award. The court also noted that the MEC's pleading referred to Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital but evidence was led regarding Charlotte Maxeke Hospital, and the appellant did not object to this evidence. However, this made no difference to the outcome as no evidence was presented regarding the availability of appropriate services at either hospital. The court's comments on the operation of state hospitals generally - including resource constraints, waiting periods, bed availability issues, and the first-come-first-served casualty system - provide context for understanding the practical difficulties in applying the 'public healthcare defence'.
This case is significant in South African law for clarifying the 'public healthcare defence' in medical negligence claims. It confirms that this defence does not require development of the common law but operates within existing Aquilian principles. The judgment establishes clear guidelines for the evidential burden on defendants who raise this defence: they must adduce cogent evidence that medical services of the same or acceptably high standard will be available at state hospitals at no cost or less than claimed. The case reinforces that merely pleading the availability of state healthcare is insufficient; concrete evidence of equivalent quality, accessibility, and cost is required. The judgment protects plaintiffs' rights to compensation in medical negligence cases while allowing defendants to reduce damages through proof of equivalent state provision. It clarifies that MSM did not develop the common law but applied existing principles. The case has important implications for allocation of state healthcare resources and compensation for medical negligence victims, balancing individual rights with state resource constraints.