On 1 June 2010, at 44 Buick Street, Beacon Valley, Mitchells Plain, a fatal shooting occurred at the residence of Jeremy Henkeman. Henkeman and his girlfriend, Jessica Guiliball (the deceased), were relaxing in their shack ('hokkie') when someone called Henkeman's name. Henkeman recognized the voice as that of 'Mugabe' (the appellant's nickname). The deceased went outside to investigate, then returned and stood in front of Henkeman. A volley of gunshots were fired at them. The deceased was fatally injured and died that night. Henkeman sustained twelve gunshot wounds and was hospitalized for about a month. Henkeman testified he recognized the appellant (Mugabe) and one 'Slappes' (third accused) standing outside with black revolvers shooting at them. Two off-duty police officers, Constables Leo and Fortuin, heard gunshots while in their vehicle nearby and saw two persons jumping over a wall - one light complexioned and one dark carrying a firearm. They followed them and alerted police. The appellant and co-accused were arrested nearby by Warrant Officer Lekay based on Leo's report that they were the same two men. The appellant and Henkeman were members of rival gangs (28 gang and Mongrels respectively) and lived in the same street. The appellant was convicted by the regional court of murder, attempted murder and unlawful possession of a firearm and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. His co-accused's appeal was upheld by the High Court but the appellant's was dismissed.
The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.
In cases where a witness has known the accused previously, questions of identification of facial characteristics and clothing are of much less importance than in cases where there was no previous acquaintance with the person sought to be identified. What is important is to test the degree of previous knowledge and the opportunity for a correct identification, having regard to the circumstances in which it was made. Where identification evidence requires corroboration, such corroboration can be found in independent evidence that corroborates the identification in all material respects. Irregularities in investigation or procedure will not vitiate a conviction unless they are so fundamental that in effect there was no trial at all, or where the irregularity has tainted the verdict. The test is whether the proper administration of justice and the dictates of public policy require that the irregularity be regarded as fatal to the proceedings. Courts must assess whether on the conspectus of all the evidence, the State has proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and whether the accused's version is reasonably possibly true, without admitting fanciful possibilities to deflect justice.
The Court observed that there was a lot of information that had not been revealed by Henkeman by reason of his involvement in gangsterism and drugs, and that such information, although not decisive in the matter, could have shed light on the motive for the shooting. The Court also noted that the manner in which the case was investigated was open to criticism and displayed 'sloppiness', referring specifically to the conduct of Warrant Officer Malan and Detective Van Reenen. The Court commented that Henkeman's evidence on its own could not be regarded as sufficiently reliable and required material corroboration by other reliable evidence.
This case is significant in South African criminal law and evidence law for clarifying and reaffirming the principles applicable to identification evidence where witnesses have prior knowledge of the accused. It demonstrates that in such cases, the degree of previous knowledge and opportunity for correct identification are more important factors than facial characteristics or clothing. The case also illustrates the approach courts should take to investigative irregularities - that they should not be allowed to deflect justice unless they are so fundamental that there was effectively no trial at all or the verdict was tainted. The judgment emphasizes that courts should guard against admitting fanciful possibilities to deflect the cause of justice and that the State is not obliged to close every possible avenue of escape for an accused. It provides guidance on when corroboration is required for identification evidence and what constitutes sufficient material corroboration.