The second and third appellants were co-trustees of the Denau Trust, owner of the farm New Glen Heatlie in Worcester district. A public stream, the Hex River, flowed over the farm and downstream through the irrigation districts of the second and third respondents. A dispute arose between the appellants and the irrigation boards (second, third and twelfth respondents) regarding the extraction and use of alleged public water on New Glen Heatlie. Although the farm was located within the second respondent's irrigation district, it was listed for zero hectares under the Water Act 54 of 1956. On 6 March 1997, the parties concluded a settlement agreement whereby the irrigation boards undertook not to object to issuing a permit allowing appellants to extract water from a pumping point for irrigation of 27 hectares. After this settlement, the appellants sank two boreholes along the surface bed of the Hex River and extracted water for irrigation. This led to two contested applications in the Cape Water Court (cases W 3/97 and W 4/98) wherein respondents sought orders declaring the water extracted from the boreholes to be public water and prohibiting its extraction. In the latter case, appellants brought a counter-application for an order declaring the settlement agreement void or unenforceable, claiming the water at the pumping point was private water and that the irrigation boards lacked authority to conclude the agreement. During the consolidated hearing on 19 October 1998, the Water Court was asked to decide a point in limine regarding the irrigation boards' authority to conclude the settlement agreement. The National Water Act 36 of 1998 came into force on 1 October 1998, abolishing Water Courts. On 11 May 1999, appellants brought an urgent application in the Cape Provincial Division for a declaratory order that no proceedings could be instituted or continued in the Cape Water Court since the National Water Act came into force. Both applications were dismissed with costs, leading to these two appeals.
Both appeals were dismissed with costs.
1. In the absence of express legislative provision to the contrary, when a court is abolished by statute while proceedings are pending before it, the general rule applies that the rights of litigating parties must be assessed according to the legal provisions in force at the time the proceedings were instituted. The abolished court retains jurisdiction to complete and decide pending matters. 2. Irrigation boards established under the Water Act 54 of 1956 possessed incidental authority under Article 79(2) to perform all acts necessary for or connected with executing their duties and functions. This included authority to enter into settlement agreements concerning disputes over alleged illegal extraction of public water, even where the dispute involved a threshold question of whether the water in question was public or private water. 3. A settlement agreement whereby irrigation boards undertook not to object to a water permit in exchange for the other party relinquishing claims to additional public water was an act within the boards' authority and did not constitute an improper adjudication of water rights between riparian owners.
The Court observed that the National Water Act 36 of 1998 brought about fundamental reform of South African water law, but noted that limited recognition was given to existing lawful water use authorized under the 1956 Water Act through provisions such as Articles 4(2), 32, 34, and 43-48. The Court noted that determination of parties' lawful water use as at 1 October 1999 was not irrelevant or inconsistent with the new dispensation, as existing lawful water use could continue until replaced by a license if required by a responsible authority. The Court assumed without deciding that the decision on the point in limine was indeed appealable.
This case is significant in South African water law as it clarified the transitional arrangements following the abolition of Water Courts by the National Water Act 36 of 1998. It established that pending proceedings in abolished courts do not automatically lapse in the absence of express legislative provision to that effect, and that such courts retain jurisdiction to complete pending matters. The case also clarified the scope of authority of irrigation boards under the 1956 Water Act to enter into settlement agreements in disputes concerning water rights, establishing that such authority flows from their incidental powers to perform acts necessary for executing their statutory duties. The judgment demonstrates the principle that courts should avoid interpretations that would produce absurd or unfair consequences, and that fundamental legal reform does not necessarily obliterate all pre-existing legal arrangements and pending proceedings.