Linah Ntombi Madalane obo Clericia Masuku v Izak Daniel Van Wyk

Clericia Masuku was born on 12 February 1991. On 17 December 2003, when she was 12 years old, she was injured in a motor vehicle accident whilst she was a passenger on a trailer towed by a vehicle driven by the respondent. On 20 September 2010, her mother, Linah Ntombi Madalane, issued summons against the respondent purporting to act on behalf of her daughter as her natural guardian. However, by the time the summons was issued, Clericia Masuku had turned 18 on 12 February 2009 and was therefore a major in terms of section 17 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005, which had come into operation on 1 July 2007 and reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18 years. The respondent raised a special plea of lack of locus standi in judicio, which was upheld by the High Court.

• Whether the appellant (mother) had locus standi in judicio to institute an action on behalf of her adult daughter
• Whether the reduction of the age of majority from 21 to 18 years by section 17 of the Children's Act affected vested rights to be assisted by a guardian in legal proceedings
• Whether the principle that statutes are presumed not to affect vested rights applied to the circumstances of this case

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

A parent or guardian lacks locus standi in judicio to institute legal proceedings on behalf of a person who has attained majority (18 years) at the time the proceedings are instituted, regardless of whether that person was a minor when the cause of action arose. The reduction of the age of majority from 21 to 18 years by section 17 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 removed a legal impediment to a person's capacity to litigate in their own name, and such capacity is to be determined at the time proceedings are instituted. A person who is a major can sue or be sued in their own name without the assistance of their legal guardian.

The Court observed that ordinarily a minor's locus standi in judicio is limited in that he or she cannot institute or defend any legal proceedings by himself or herself, and requires the assistance of his or her guardian. The Court also noted the general principle that statutes are presumed not to affect vested rights and are presumed to govern transactions in the future and not those in the past, though this principle did not assist the appellant in the circumstances of this case.

This case clarifies the application of section 17 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005, which reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18 years, in the context of locus standi in judicio. It establishes that once a person attains majority at age 18 under the Children's Act, a parent no longer has standing to institute legal proceedings on behalf of that person, even if the cause of action arose when the person was a minor under the previous regime. The case also demonstrates the limits of the vested rights doctrine in this context, showing that the reduction of the age of majority removes legal impediments rather than imposing them, and that procedural capacity is determined at the time proceedings are instituted, not when the cause of action arose.