The respondent was initially employed by Board of Executors 1838 (BOE 1838) from February 1990. On 17 May 1991, he received a letter from BOE Merchant Bank Limited (BOE MB) confirming his appointment as Manager effective 1 January 1991. The appellant, Board of Executors Limited, owned all shares in both BOE 1838 and BOE MB within the BOE group of companies. The respondent worked in the financial innovation unit, with his salary administratively paid by BOE 1838 but recovered from BOE MB. On 3 December 1991, the appellant's managing director offered the respondent share options in the appellant company. On 15 September 1992, the respondent's employment was terminated by letter on the appellant's letterhead signed by the group regional director, stating operational requirements necessitated closing the financial innovation unit. The Industrial Court substituted the appellant for BOE MB as respondent in unfair labour practice proceedings. The main dispute concerned which entity was the respondent's actual employer at the time of retrenchment.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The finding that Board of Executors Ltd was the employer (or co-employer) of the respondent was upheld.
The binding legal principle is that in determining who is an employer within a group of companies, the court must look to the substance of the relationship rather than merely the formal corporate structure. Where an entity (in this case the holding company) has ultimate direct control over an employee's activities, demonstrated particularly by the power to terminate employment, that entity is an employer or co-employer regardless of which subsidiary company may handle administrative functions like payroll or day-to-day supervision. The entity that terminates employment and offers a retrenchment package is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, demonstrating ultimate control and thereby establishing itself as the employer or a co-employer. The definition of 'employer' in section 1 of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 must be interpreted with regard to the actual relationship between the parties, not merely the formal documentation or corporate structure.
The court made observations about the confusion that can arise in group company employment arrangements where different entities perform different employment functions (one pays salary, another supervises, another terminates). The court noted that it was 'hardly surprising' that the respondent was confused about who his employer was given the different roles played by BOE 1838 (salary payment), BOE MB (supervision), and the appellant (termination and share options). The court also commented that while the appellant may have purported to structure its affairs so as to have no employees, 'the true relationship between the respondent and the companies within the group did not accord with that structure.' This suggests that attempts to use corporate structuring to avoid employment obligations will not succeed if the actual relationship differs from the formal structure. The concession by appellant's counsel that if the appellant had ultimate control the appeal must fail was noted as 'correctly made.'
This case is significant in South African labour law for establishing that the formal corporate structure of a group of companies does not necessarily determine employment relationships. It affirms the principle of looking beyond formal arrangements to the substance of the employment relationship. The case establishes that ultimate control over termination of employment is a key factor in determining who is the employer. It also recognizes the possibility of multiple co-employers within a corporate group. The judgment reinforces that courts will examine the totality of the relationship, including who has the power to hire and fire, who offers incentives, and who exercises ultimate control, rather than simply accepting the corporate structure presented by the employer. This remains important precedent for determining employment relationships in complex corporate group structures.