Obiang v Janse van Rensburg and Others

The appellant, Teodorin Nguema Obiang, President of Equatorial Guinea, was sued in the Western Cape High Court by the first respondent, Daniel Welman Janse van Rensburg, for damages arising from the latter’s alleged wrongful arrest, detention, assault and torture in Equatorial Guinea. Jurisdiction was founded by attachment of the appellant’s property in Clifton, Cape Town. The appellant terminated his South African attorneys’ mandate in July 2020 but failed to file a notice in terms of rule 16(2)(b) appointing an address for service. His former attorneys filed notices of withdrawal indicating the Equatorial Guinea Embassy in Pretoria as an address where he was reachable. Thereafter, various court processes, including an application to strike out his defence and notices of set down for trial, were served at the Embassy and emailed to embassy officials. The appellant did not oppose the striking-out application, resulting in his defence being struck out, and later default judgment was granted against him. Only after a writ of execution was served at his Clifton property did the appellant seek rescission of the orders under rule 42(1)(a), alleging lack of proper service. The High Court and a full bench dismissed the rescission application, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel where employed.

The case clarifies the operation of rule 16 of the Uniform Rules of Court, particularly the obligations of litigants who terminate their attorneys’ mandates. It affirms that courts will prioritise the purpose of service—actual notice—over formalistic compliance, and that litigants cannot evade proceedings by failing to appoint an address for service. The judgment reinforces limits on rescission under rule 42(1)(a) and discourages conduct that frustrates the orderly continuation of litigation.