The respondent, Njemla, brought an urgent application on behalf of the KwaLindile Community for an interim interdict restraining King Sabata Dalindyebo (KSD) Municipality and others from developing land known as the remainder of erf 912 Mthatha, pending finalization of land claims over the property. The application was brought in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. On 2 October 2007, this court granted the interim interdict and awarded costs in favor of the respondent. The KSD Municipality had opposed the application and brought a review application against the Regional Land Claims Commissioner for publishing a notice that the land under development was being claimed. Subsequently, the respondent's legal representatives indicated in late supplementary heads of argument and post-judgment communications that the land being developed was never dispossessed and therefore fell outside the Restitution Act's jurisdiction. The respondent himself later affirmed in a sworn affidavit that the land lying outside the fenced Enkululekweni Ministerial Complex was never dispossessed. The applicant (KSD Municipality) then sought rescission of the costs order on two grounds: (1) that the respondent lacked locus standi as his mandate from the KwaLindile Community had been repudiated; and (2) that the respondent had repudiated the jurisdictional base upon which the order was granted by asserting the land was never dispossessed and thus fell outside the Restitution Act.
1. Condonation granted for the applicant's non-compliance with the time frame set out in Rule 64(2) of the Rules of the Land Claims Court. 2. Paragraph A(3) of the order handed down on 2 October 2007 (being the costs order) is rescinded and set aside. 3. Any warrants of execution issued pursuant to the costs order are annulled. 4. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the rescission application.
A court has inherent common law jurisdiction to rescind its own order in the interests of justice where the party who obtained the order subsequently repudiates the very jurisdictional foundation upon which that order was granted. Where an applicant succeeds in obtaining an interim interdict on the basis that the Land Claims Court has jurisdiction under the Restitution of Land Rights Act because land was dispossessed, but subsequently asserts in sworn testimony that the land was never dispossessed (thus placing the matter outside the Act's jurisdiction), it would be manifestly inequitable to allow that party to retain the benefits of a costs order obtained on a jurisdictional basis he has himself contradicted. The court's error in granting relief without jurisdiction can be corrected through the exercise of inherent rescission powers, even where statutory rescission remedies are unavailable.
The court noted that it remained a mystery why the respondent opposed the review application and why, once he had revisited his earlier stance regarding dispossession, he did not abandon the interdict order entirely and tender costs. Bam JP observed that "in this particular case the provisions of the Restitution Act may have been used merely as a stepping stone to halt the development on the disputed land and thereby gain a foothold exclusively to bargain for a stake in the development having jettisoned the attentions of both the applicant as well as the commission for land claims." The court emphasized that its acceptance that the interdict was granted in error did not mean it accepted as fact that the land was never dispossessed or was not under claim - that issue would need to be finally determined if and when the validity of a land claim over the land is decided. The court also commented adversely on the "unethical" nature of direct post-judgment communication from the respondent's legal representative to the court regarding jurisdictional issues.
This case establishes important principles regarding the Land Claims Court's inherent jurisdiction to rescind its own orders in the interests of justice, even where statutory rescission provisions do not apply. It demonstrates that a party cannot approbate and reprobate - successfully obtaining relief on a particular jurisdictional basis and then repudiating that very basis while retaining the benefits of the order. The judgment serves as a warning against the misuse of the Restitution Act as a tactical device to achieve objectives unrelated to genuine land restitution claims. It affirms that where a court acts without jurisdiction (such as granting relief under the Restitution Act where land was never dispossessed), it has inherent power to correct that error even after judgment. The case also illustrates the limits of locus standi challenges - subsequent repudiation of a mandate does not retrospectively invalidate authority that existed at the time of the original proceedings.