Cape Estates Properties (Pty) Ltd owned Erf 25541, George, which originated from a larger property historically used partly as a sawmill and partly as pine plantation. In 2001, under s 14 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (LUPO), the George Local Municipality determined that the sawmill portion of the larger property would be zoned industrial and the remainder agricultural, subject to conditions including the submission of a site plan showing the sawmill and its structures. Subsequent subdivision applications in 2002 and 2008 separated the sawmill land (eventually Erf 25541) from the remainder, with subdivision plans approved and endorsed by the Municipality indicating industrial zoning for the subdivided sawmill portion. In 2017, when the Municipality adopted a new Integrated Zoning Scheme Map, Erf 25541 was depicted as partly industrial (approximately 4.1 hectares) and partly agricultural. Cape Estates contended this split zoning was erroneous and applied for rectification under the George Integrated Zoning Scheme By-Law. The Municipality refused the application and an internal appeal, asserting that the industrial zoning was limited to the actual sawmill footprint and that condition 2 of the 2001 zoning determination had not been complied with. Cape Estates successfully reviewed these decisions in the High Court on appeal to a full court, leading to the Municipality’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel. The full court’s order was upheld, declaring that the entire extent of Erf 25541 is zoned Industrial Zone II without restriction to sawmill use, and reviewing and setting aside the decision of the Municipal Appeal Authority, substituting it with an order upholding Cape Estates’ internal appeal.
The judgment clarifies the limits of municipal powers when adopting new zoning schemes, confirming that municipalities may not use updated zoning maps to conduct impermissible rezoning exercises where historical zoning rights exist. It affirms the doctrine of substantial compliance with zoning conditions, the proper interpretation of conditional approvals under LUPO and successor legislation, and the circumstances under which courts may substitute administrative decisions under PAJA. The case is significant for landowners and municipalities dealing with legacy zoning determinations and SPLUMA-era zoning schemes.